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UNION DUES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES AND LEGAL CHALLENGES
By, Ann C. Hodges
Ann C. Hodges is Professor of Law at the University of Richmond. She is the author of numerous articles
and book chapters and coauthor of two books, Public Sector Employment: Cases and Materials (West
2010) and Principles of Employment Law (West 2009). She is a member of The Labor Law Group and
of the editorial board of Employee Rights & Employment Policy Journal. She joined the University of
Richmond faculty in 1988 after practicing law with Katz, Friedman, Schur and Eagle in Chicago. This
article was based in part on a longer article previously published in the Employee Rights and
Employment Policy Journal entitled Maintaining Union Resources in an Era of Public Sector Bargaining
Retrenchment, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 599 (2012).

I.

INTRODUCTION

The economic crisis that began in 2008 led many states and localities to look for
ways to reduce labor costs, which form a substantial portion of government
budgets. Some state legislatures focused on collective bargaining laws, with
Wisconsin being the most high profile example. Along with the restrictions on
bargaining,[1] a number of states moved to limit the collection of union dues. The
limitations were not across the board, but primarily directed at either political
expenditures of unions or at particular unions, most commonly education
unions. Not surprisingly, the laws enacted were immediately subjected to legal
challenge since unions, like every other organization, depend on finances to
operate. This article will review the newly enacted legislation relating to union
dues, the resulting legal challenges, and the law on which they are based. It will
also highlight countervailing trends in some states and discuss the Supreme
Court’s 2012 decision in Knox v. Service Employees International Union Local
1000[2] which portends additional possible restrictions on unions’ ability to
collect dues. The article will end with an analysis of why the legislative focus on
union dues, which have virtually no direct impact on government budgets, and a
discussion of the implications of these developments for the future. This is an area
of law that is in flux and bears watching, as it will impact the survival of unions and
stable labor relations.[3]
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
Litigation over union dues is ubiquitous, in part because of the role played by the
Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, which has an express purpose of
Published quarterly by the University of Illinois School of Labor and Employment Relations at Urbana
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litigating issues relating to union dues in order to prevent unions from requiring
employees to pay them.[4] A series of Supreme Court cases have set the
parameters of the law. The First Amendment free speech provisions and the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause have formed the basis of most of
the challenges.
The First Amendment limits the ability of unions to collect dues from objecting
employees. Unions may require payments from employees who are not voluntary
members of the union only in states that authorize unions to charge the costs of
representation to all employees that they are required to represent. These states
either require payment by statute or expressly permit unions and employers to
negotiate agreements mandating payment. The purposes for which these fair
share or agency fees can be used are limited by the First Amendment to activities
related to collective bargaining; they may not be spent on “ideological activities
unrelated to collective bargaining.”[5] Objectors can prevent the use of their fees
for these nonchargeable expenditures and have the right to challenge the union’s
determination as to which expenditures are chargeable.[6] Further, states may
constitutionally prevent unions from using agency fees of nonmembers for political
purposes without their consent.[7]
The Supreme Court has also addressed First Amendment and Equal Protection
challenges to state law limits on payroll deduction of dues and agency fees. Such
dues checkoffs make it much easier for the union to collect dues and
fees. In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, the Court rejected a First
Amendment challenge to Idaho’s law barring deduction of employees’ dues used
for political purposes, stating that the law merely declined to assist in promoting
speech and did not actively abridge the employees’ freedom of speech. [8] As a
result, the state need only show a rational basis for its decision, and the desire to
avoid entanglement in partisan politics satisfied that standard.[9] That the law
might reduce funds available to the union was of no moment in the absence of a
direct abridgement of speech.[10]
In City of Charlotte v. Local 660, International Association of Firefighters, the
Supreme Court upheld the city’s refusal to deduct union dues despite the fact that
it granted deduction requests for other purposes.[11] The Court held that the city’s
established standards for determining which dues deduction requests it would
grant met the rational basis test.[12]
The city has determined that it will provide withholding only for programs of general interest in
which all city or departmental employees can, without more, participate. Employees can
participate in the union checkoff only if they join an outside organization the union. Thus, Local
660 does not fit the category of groups for which the city will withhold. We cannot say that denying
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withholding to associational or special interest groups that claim only some departmental
employees as members and that employees must first join before being eligible to participate in
the checkoff marks an arbitrary line so devoid of reason as to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Rather, this division seems a reasonable method for providing the benefit of withholding to
employees in their status as employees, while limiting the number of instances of withholding and
the financial and administrative burdens attendant thereon.[13]

Ysursa and City of Charlotte indicate that complete bans on dues deduction,
whether for political purposes or generally, are likely to survive legal challenge. Yet
if the employer distinguishes among organizations in application of its dues policy,
it must at least have a rational basis for such distinctions. Additionally, while the
government may freely decline to assist or fund citizen speech, it may not do so for
reasons based on viewpoint.[14] Dues deduction bans that apply to some groups
of employees and organizations and not others are vulnerable to legal
challenge.[15]
Applying these principles, lower courts have upheld policies that limit payroll
deduction to unions that are majority representatives as justified by goals of labor
peace and stability.[16] For similar reasons, courts have upheld numerosity
requirements that limit payroll deduction to unions with larger
memberships.[17] In South Carolina Education Ass’n v. Campbell, the Fourth
Circuit upheld a law which barred dues deductions for all membership
organizations except one open to all state employees.[18] The court recognized
several rational bases for the limit, including the administrative and financial
burdens of deducting dues for every requesting organization and fostering healthy
employment relations with the state’s employees through the organization open to
all.[19] Where termination of dues checkoff is in retaliation for the exercise of
speech and associational rights, however, it may violate the First Amendment,
although the employer need not provide the checkoff in the first instance.[20] With
this background, the article will next look at the limitations enacted in 2011 and
2012.
III. DUES LIMITATIONS OF 2011 AND 2012
With the revolutionary changes in public sector bargaining laws in recent years
came changes in dues laws as well. Both Alabama and Arizona enacted limitations
on dues deductions for political purposes.[21] Wisconsin eliminated fair share and
payroll deduction of dues for all except public safety employees.[22] Michigan and
North Carolina eliminated payroll deduction for education employees.[23] Many
other states proposed similar limitations.[24] In addition, the enactment of right
to work legislation will bar negotiation of fair share agreements in Indiana and
Michigan.[25]
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The payroll deduction limitations in Alabama, Arizona, Michigan, North Carolina
and Wisconsin were all enjoined on constitutional grounds. One of the Wisconsin
cases was recently reversed by the Seventh Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit just
reversed the Michigan case.[26] These decisions and the specifics of the laws
enjoined will be discussed below.
A.

Deductions for Political Purposes

The Alabama law limits public employee payroll deductions for political activity or
for membership dues for organizations that use such dues for political
activity.[27] This prohibition appears narrower than a total ban, but in effect may
discourage all dues deductions because of criminal sanctions imposed for violation
of the law and the inability of individual employees to control the use of their dues.
The Alabama law also requires the membership organizations to certify and prove
each year that none of the membership dues were spent on political activity.
Failure to do so or false submission would terminate the organization’s ability to
obtain dues deduction.
The Alabama law was enjoined based on a First Amendment challenge in Alabama
Education Association v. Bentley,[28] which found the statute overbroad and
vague. The Eleventh Circuit narrowed the injunction, however, allowing the law to
take effect so long as it applied only to dues deductions for electioneering activities,
certifying to the Alabama Supreme Court questions about the scope of the
statute.[29] Subsequently, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ equal
protection and viewpoint discrimination claims but declined to dismiss the claims
of retaliation for constitutionally protected speech, which are currently in the
discovery process.[30]
The Arizona law requires organizations accepting dues through payroll deduction
to certify that none of the dues are used for political purposes or to specify the
percentage used for political purposes, with a substantial fine if the predicted
percentage is exceeded.[31] It also requires a special written authorization from
employees, renewed annually, to have deducted dues used for political purposes.
The law exempts charitable organizations, employee benefits organizations, and
organizations of public safety officers from its provisions. The Arizona law was
preliminarily, and then permanently, enjoined on First Amendment grounds
because it was not uniformly applied to unions and other organizations that could
use funds for political purposes and therefore, was not viewpoint neutral.[32]

6

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT
B.

SPRING 2013

Deductions of Full Dues for Certain Unions

Legislatures in Michigan, North Carolina and Wisconsin banned deduction of all
dues for identified unions, with Wisconsin also eliminating fair share
agreements. In Michigan and North Carolina, the ban applied only to education
unions, while in Wisconsin, it applied to general employee unions, but not public
safety employee unions, which were defined in the statute.[33] The District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan enjoined the legislation from taking effect,
concluding that the union plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of both
their Equal Protection and First Amendment claims.[34] The court found no
rational basis for the legislation, suggesting that it appeared to be directed at
limiting the power and speech of a politically unpopular group based on
viewpoint. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the defendants’ motion for a
stay of the district court’s injunction but subsequently reversed the district court’s
decision, finding no viewpoint discrimination.[35] The North Carolina Superior
Court issued a temporary restraining order, and later preliminary and permanent
injunctions, preventing the legislation from taking effect on both procedural and
substantive constitutional grounds, the latter retaliatory viewpoint
discrimination.[36]
The legal path of the Wisconsin statute is more complex. Lawsuits were filed in
both state and federal court. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected a procedural
challenge to the statute based on the state constitution,[37] while the federal
district court and a state trial court both found the dues deduction provisions of
the statute unconstitutional based on the unjustifiable distinction between general
and public safety unions.[38] The federal district court upheld the limitation of fair
share provisions to public safety employees while the state trial court found the
entire law unconstitutional in one case. The decision of the federal district court
was recently reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the
statute in its entirety.[39]
C.

Legislative Patterns

There is an unmistakable pattern in these legislative actions which led to initial
court victories for unions challenging their constitutionality. Most of the laws
apply to some but not all unions, burdening the speech of the disfavored
organizations. Most of the laws were enacted using surreptitious and unusual, and
sometimes improper, legislative tactics. Additionally, most targeted particular
unions that had recently engaged in political activities in opposition to proponents
of the legislation. And finally, in most cases, leaders of the legislative body made
public statements suggesting political reasons for the legislation. These common
elements, which will be discussed in more detail below, supported the argument
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that the motivation for the dues deduction bans was either suppression of certain
political views or retaliation for political activity or both.
Except for the Alabama statute, the laws target some, but not all unions. The
Arizona and Wisconsin bills except public safety unions from the ban, while
Michigan and North Carolina barred deductions only for education unions. In
North Carolina, only the North Carolina Association of Educators was affected,
because the authorizing legislation permitted deductions only for unions with a
specified level of membership. This distinction between unions alone led the
Arizona court to enjoin enforcement of the statute.[40]
A brief description of the enactment of the legislation in the other four states will
demonstrate the remainder of the legislative pattern. In Alabama, the court
allowed the claim of retaliatory viewpoint discrimination to proceed, noting that
the plaintiff, Alabama Education Association, had repeatedly clashed with the
Governor on political issues and then subsequently supported an opponent to his
chosen successor in the Republican primary.[41] The Governor announced that
the organization should stay out of the primary and two days later the state
comptroller decided to stop the longstanding practice of making payroll
deductions for political action committees, a decision for which the Governor took
credit. After the election, which resulted in a Republican sweep of the legislature
and governorship, the legislation at issue, which codified the practice instituted by
the comptroller, was enacted.
In Michigan, the legislation had lain dormant for months.[42] It was resurrected
and passed using a suspension of rules in both chambers within hours of the
union’s announcement of a political campaign to obtain a constitutional
amendment protecting collective bargaining.[43] According to the complaint, the
decision to seek the constitutional amendment followed a series of legislative
enactments curbing collective bargaining rights and reducing the benefits of school
employees, which triggered a political response by the union, including a recall
effort directed at the primary sponsor of the legislation.[44] The complaint also
quotes the Speaker of the House stating that the union has “declared war” by
promoting recalls and the Senate Majority Leader as saying “[t]he teachers union
specifically the Michigan Education Association have lost their (sic) way and public
school employees should no longer be forced to join them.”[45]
The court enjoined the legislation, finding the action was likely to succeed on the
merits because the legislation had no rational basis; instead it appeared to be
motivated by a desire to limit the political power of an unpopular group by limiting
their ability to speak. The court rejected the asserted cost rationale for the law,
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noting that the legislature had found the cost was negligible.[46] In these days of
computer payroll systems, the cost of adding deductions is far less than in earlier
times and, as the Michigan court recognized, may no longer be sufficient to justify
limitations. The court of appeals reversed, over a strong dissent, finding no
likelihood of success on the merits. The court found no viewpoint discrimination
since the legislation was directed at school employers not unions, and the
deduction process was neither speech nor a nonpublic forum.[47]
The North Carolina legislation followed a path similar to that of Michigan. Despite
numerous legislative sessions and a Senate override vote, the House of
Representatives failed for months to consider overriding the Governor’s veto of the
legislation, which was scheduled to take effect July 1, 2011.[48] Then in January
2012, after a late night veto session called for the sole purpose of considering
another vetoed bill, the House adjourned and reconvened to override the
Governor’s veto on the dues deduction bill at 12:45 a.m.[49] The Speaker of the
House was quoted as stating that the legislation was prompted by the Association’s
mailings targeting Democrats who had voted with Republicans on the state budget,
and he subsequently acknowledged that the organization’s politics were a factor
in the legislation.[50] As in the case of Michigan, these statements reflect the
strategic timing of the legislation, in direct response to political activity by the
Association. The permanent injunction was based on “retaliatory viewpoint
discrimination.”[51]
Finally, the highly publicized Wisconsin legislation reveals a similar pattern. It
was peculiarly structured using unprecedented classifications that targeted unions
which did not support the governor’s election, while preserving dues deduction for
unions that supported the Governor.[52] Statements by State Senate Majority
Leader Scott Fitzgerald were even clearer than those in Michigan and North
Carolina regarding the intent to suppress political views. Fitzgerald stated,
If we win this battle [over the passage of the Act], and the money is not there under the auspices
of the unions, certainly what you’re going to find is President Obama is going to have a . . . much
more difficult time getting elected and winning the state of Wisconsin.[53]

As in Michigan and North Carolina, quick votes and limited opportunities for
public input at hearings characterized the legislative process. Initial efforts to pass
the legislation surfaced quickly and surprised advocates, resulting in the escape of
the Democratic legislators to Illinois to avoid passage.[54] The actual passage
involved parliamentary maneuvers that were challenged as violative of the Open
Meetings Law and state constitutional provisions requiring open hearings.[55]
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There were several legal challenges to the law. The federal district court, analyzing
the equal protection claim, found that there was no rational basis for the
differential treatment of general unions and public safety unions with respect to
dues deduction, rejecting as unpersuasive the rationale of preventing strikes by
public safety employees.[56] The court noted that the law allowed public safety
unions to collect fair share fees from objecting employees, while barring general
unions from using payroll deduction to collect fees from voluntary members,
suggesting that this result seemed particularly unlikely to further the goal of
deterring strikes among public safety employees.[57] Further, the court found that
the only apparent rationale for the distinction among unions was to suppress the
speech of the general unions; consequently, the law violated the First
Amendment.[58] The court did not find that the limitations on collective
bargaining, which included a bar to negotiating fair share agreements, violated the
constitution.[59] The court found fear of public safety strikes a more persuasive
justification for this part of the law.[60] By way of contrast, the Dane County
Circuit Court found the entire statute unconstitutional on both First Amendment
and Equal Protection grounds because the distinctions between unions burdened
the speech and association rights of some employees, but not others, without
adequate justification.[61]
The Seventh Circuit panel rejected the analysis of the lower court on the dues issue,
upholding the entire law.[62] The majority opinion found that dues deduction is a
subsidy of speech and, thus, differential treatment of speakers is permissible
unless the classification on the basis of speaker identity is inherently based on
viewpoint.[63] The court concluded there was no reason to assume that different
unions have different viewpoints.[64] Neither the disproportionate impact on
groups with a particular view (Governor Walker’s opponents), nor the expressed
political purpose of one member of the legislature established a motive of
viewpoint discrimination. Having found no viewpoint discrimination, the court
then applied a rational basis test to the entire statute and concluded that the
interest in labor peace among essential employees was rational even if the
classifications may have been imperfectly suited to that purpose.[65] It refused to
probe the motivations of the legislature and, indeed, suggested that politically
motivated legislation was a reality of the democratic system.[66]
Judge Hamilton dissented as to the finding regarding the dues deduction, while
agreeing that the “flimsy” rationale of the state was sufficient for the “deferential
rational basis” review of the remainder of the statute.[67] Judge Hamilton
concluded that once the state offered dues deduction it was not just a subsidy of
speech but, instead, the dues deduction system became a nonpublic forum, which
had to be viewpoint neutral.[68] Judge Hamilton, like the district court but unlike
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the majority, was willing to look behind the facial viewpoint neutrality.[69] Three
factors convinced Judge Hamilton that the law was not viewpoint neutral. First,
Judge Hamilton found a lack of fit between the purpose of labor peace and the
classification, resulting in the protection of dues deduction for unions that
endorsed Walker and denial to those that did not.[70] For example, corrections
officers, Capitol Police and the University of Wisconsin Police, who have important
public safety responsibilities, were considered general employees, while the Motor
Vehicle Inspectors, whose association endorsed Governor Walker, were
considered public safety employees whose strike would endanger the
public.[71] Relatedly, and for the same reason, Judge Hamilton found the state’s
justifications for the classification weak, since a strike by corrections officers would
be far more damaging than a strike by Motor Vehicle Inspectors.[72] Finally, the
Fitzgerald statement revealing a political purpose was the third factor that
persuaded Judge Hamilton that the ostensible neutrality masked a motive of
viewpoint suppression.[73]
The Seventh Circuit’s disposition is not the final word on the Wisconsin legislation
as litigation in the state courts[74] and before the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission is ongoing. If the rationale of the panel majority is accepted
in other jurisdictions, however, many, if not all, recent dues limitations could be
upheld as constitutional.[75] Before turning to the future, however, a brief review
of other legislation relating to dues is helpful.
IV. RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
Legislation regarding dues is not limited to bans or partial bans on dues deduction
or elimination of fair share legislation. Both Indiana and Michigan adopted right
to work laws in the last year, which prohibit public and private employee unions
from negotiating fair share or agency shop agreements.[76] Like the dues
deduction and fair share legislation discussed above, these laws restrict the ability
of unions to fund their activities because unions are still required by law to
represent all employees in their bargaining units where collective bargaining
legislation exists. A constitutional challenge to the Indiana law was recently
rejected,[77] while a challenge to the Michigan law is pending.[78]
V. STATE ACTIONS FAVORING UNION DUES COLLECTION
Not all recent state actions regarding union dues have imposed restrictions on
unions, however. California voters rejected a 2012 ballot referendum to ban
payroll deduction of political contributions.[79] While applying to both
corporations and unions, it was widely agreed that unions would suffer far more if
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the referendum passed because they rely far more heavily on payroll deduction for
political funding than businesses.[80] In 2011, Maryland state employees began
paying fair share fees for the first time under a law enacted in 2009.[81] New
Hampshire has twice rejected proposals to enact a right to work law.[82] In
addition, other state legislatures have entertained proposals to require fair share
or payroll deduction of dues.[83]
This review of the recent legislation and the cases challenging these new laws
provides clues as to the reasons for their passage. We turn to this in the next
section.
VI. WHY UNION DUES?
One might ask why union dues have drawn such attention in recent years. While
critics have branded collection of union dues as a self-interested grab for power
and money,[84] the simple truth is that unions, like any other organization, cannot
accomplish their purpose without resources. The sophistication of employers, the
complexity of benefit programs such as pension and health insurance plans, the
size and intricacy of governmental budgets, and the powerful anti-tax and antigovernment lobbies, among other things, require a sophisticated and powerful
union to accomplish the goals and protect the interests of public
employees.[85] Labor unions have limited ability to raise funds from sources other
than their members, or where fair share applies, from all employees they
represent. Accordingly, dues are necessary to permit the organization to continue
to operate.
Payroll deduction is important because it provides an effective mechanism for dues
collection that requires only a single authorization from the employee. Once an
employee authorizes payroll deduction, an employer deducts dues each pay period
and remits them to the union. In the absence of payroll deduction, unions must
establish independent mechanisms for dues collection, and no other method is as
effective as payroll deduction. Data demonstrates that even where membership is
already voluntary, elimination of payroll deduction can result in substantial losses
in dues payment and membership.[86] The union must then expend resources on
organization and dues collection that might otherwise be spent on activities that
directly benefit the bargaining unit.
Thus, union dues are important to fund both the union’s representational and
political activities. While opponents often object to the political activity of unions,
in the public sector union political activity can directly impact the terms and
conditions of employment of the employees the union represents.[87] For

12

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

SPRING 2013

example, increased government funding makes more money available for
government employees’ wages and benefits or additional staffing to reduce their
workload. Additionally, political action can directly impact the working conditions
of employees. Longer school days and larger classes affect teacher workloads, as
does the number of police officers assigned to a shift or the number of firefighters
to a truck. Yet it is precisely the power to influence such decisions that leads to
opposition to public sector unions.
Opponents of unions in general and of public sector bargaining in particular see
the funding limitations created by the economic crisis as an opportunity to limit
the power of public sector unions. The Right to Work Committee and the National
Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation have long been active in this role in both
the public and private sectors, but in recent years they have been joined by
conservative groups arguing that the power of public sector unions is detrimental
to the public interest. When the economic storm hit, devastating state and local
government budgets, these conservative groups seized the opportunity to push for
legislation limiting bargaining and dues collection. Model legislation developed by
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and the policy papers and
proposals of other conservative think tank organizations reveal the goal of the
elimination of mandatory collective bargaining, fair share, and payroll deduction
of union dues.[88] Additionally, political rhetoric and research from conservative
organizations and politicians have focused heavily on teachers and their unions as
impediments to education reform.[89] These conservative groups frequently cite
the size, power, and political spending of the National Education Association, the
largest union in the country,[90] as an obstacle to educational change.[91] Finally,
there is the pure political reality that unions lean heavily Democratic and any
impairment of their ability to collect funds benefits Republican and conservative
causes.[92] Given these facts, along with Republican successes in state level
elections in 2010, the emergence of strikingly similar legislative campaigns
directed at union dues, particularly of the teachers’ unions, is not
surprising.[93] Having reviewed the current status of the law, and the reasons for
the importance of the issue to both unions and their opponents, we look next to
what the future holds.
VII. THE FUTURE
The legal battles over existing legislation are likely to continue. It seems unlikely,
however, that the union plaintiffs will petition for U.S. Supreme Court review of
any losing decision, although the defendants well might. Unions have been largely
unsuccessful in the Supreme Court in recent dues cases and the rhetoric from some
justices suggests an inclination to restrict dues collection even further.[94] Last

SPRING 2013

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

13

term, in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, the Court
rejected the union’s argument that it did not need to send an additional notice to
members regarding a mid-year special assessment, providing them the
opportunity to object to any political spending included.[95] The Court also
reached out to decide an issue neither briefed nor argued by the parties.[96] The
Court determined that the union could not charge objectors the percentage of the
assessment that represented chargeable expenses from the previous year, even
though this prevented the union from collecting the full cost of
representation.[97] Even more striking, the Court ruled that nonmembers could
not be charged the assessment at all unless they opted in, instead of applying the
opt out rule used in all prior cases.[98] This was a position that was not even
advocated by the petitioners.[99] The majority opinion extensively discussed and
critiqued longstanding precedent, under which unions were allowed to charge
nonmembers the cost of representation unless the employees opted out of the
charges.[100]The Court did not overrule these decisions, however.[101] While
the Knox decision has been criticized as at odds with other First Amendment cases
such as Citizens United,[102] the Court’s disposition in Knox may foreshadow a
future Court decision that limits the ability of a union to charge nonmembers the
cost of representation absent the nonmember’s consent.
Depending on the political winds, additional legislation may impair or assist
unions in their ability to collect dues from their members and other employees that
they represent. Although the recent legislation discussed above may be vulnerable
to legal attack because of the structure and circumstances surrounding passage, it
is clear from earlier cases that bans on payroll deduction and fair share can be
structured to meet constitutional requirements, particularly if legislators are
willing to ban deductions for all unions. Unions might be well-served to invest in
alternative methods of dues collection such as automatic credit card charges or
bank drafts, which are relatively efficient and require a reduced expenditure of
union resources. Employees can terminate these deductions more easily than
employer-based deductions, however, requiring the union to engage in continual
marketing to convince employees of the value of their union membership. While
this too requires investment of funds, such campaigning is essential to union
survival and effective employee representation in the current political climate,
where affluent union opponents spend massive sums of money to convince
employees that unions are not acting in their best interests.
The future of unions and collective bargaining is closely tied to the ability of unions
to maintain their funding. Collective bargaining has predominated historically in
the United States as a vehicle for employee voice and as an instrument of limiting
income inequality.[103] In addition, in the public sector, union lobbying can
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persuade legislators to fund important government initiatives, such as those
relating to education and law enforcement. Collective bargaining also has a role to
play in times of crisis and may lead to creative solutions to governmental
challenges. Without a reliable source of funding, the role of unions in collective
bargaining and in the political process will be diminished. Severe reductions in the
ability of unions to facilitate employee participation in the workplace and the
political process will bring about fundamental changes in the American
democracy. Given the power and resources of union opponents and the current
slide in union membership, accelerated by state legislation, such change is not
beyond the realm of possibility. A robust debate about the role of unions in public
employment is a worthy endeavor for there are strongly held conflicting views.
However, without a viable labor movement such a debate will be both one-sided
and meaningless.
[1] See Martin H. Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public-Sector Labor Law: A Search for
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[85] See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221 (1977); Clyde Summers, Bargaining in
the Government’s Business: Principles and Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 265, 269, 272, 279 (1987).
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Wisconsin Act 10 Provisions to ALEC, P.R. WATCH (Ctr. for Media & Democracy, Madison,
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[89] See, e.g., Bills Affecting Americans’ Rights to a Public Education, ALEC EXPOSED, htt
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st modified Jan. 30, 2012, 5:23 PM); Lindsey Burke, Creating a Crisis: Unions Stifle Education
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Bentley, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1296-98 (describing political conflicts between the Alabama
Education Association and the governor and a state senator and gubernatorial candidate who
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[90] About NEA, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/2580.htm (last visited Nov. 27,
2012) (describing NEA as the largest professional employee organization in the U.S. with three
million members and affiliates in every state); See National Education Association Form LM-2
(Sept. 2011- Aug. 2012), available at, http://kcerds.dol-esa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do (in “Union
Name by Abbreviation” drop down menu select “NEA-National Education ASN IND”; then select
“LM-2” in “Report Type” drop down menu; then select the “submit” button at the bottom of the
page; then scroll to file number 000-342 on the results page, and click on “2011 Report”
hyperlink in the second column) (showing total membership of 3,068,237 and total receipts of
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[91] See Burke, supra note 89; According to the National Institute on Money in State Politics,
the NEA and its affiliates were the top political donors in 2007-2008, contributing over $56
million. Top National Donors 2007-2008, FOLLOW THE MONEY (Nat’l Inst. on Money in State
Politics, Helena, Mont.), http://www.followthemoney.org/database/top10000.phtml (last
visited Nov. 27, 2012).
[92] Paul F. Clark, Using Members’ Dues for Political Purposes: The “Paycheck Protection”
Movement, 20 J. LAB RES. 329, 340 (1999); Richard Michael Fischl, “Running the Government
Like a Business”: Wisconsin and the Assault on Workplace Democracy, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39,
39-40, 60-63 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/996.pdf; Beau Ho
dai, Publicopoly Exposed: How ALEC, the Koch Brothers and Their Corporate Allies Plan to
Privatize Government, IN THESE TIMES, July 11, 2011, http://inthesetimes.Com/article
/11603/. Unions are not all Democratic supporters, however, as evidenced by the support of
some public safety unions for Gov. Walker. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
[93] See, e.g., Kersey, supra note 88, at 17-19.
[94] See Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012) (“Once
it is recognized … that a nonmember cannot be forced to fund a union’s political or ideological
activities, what is the justification for putting the burden on the nonmember to opt out of making
such a payment? … An opt-out system creates a risk that the dues paid by nonmembers will be
used to further political and ideological ends with which they do not agree.”).
[95] Id. at 2291-93.
[96] Id. at 2292-96, 2297-99 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[97] Id. at 2293-96.
[98] Id. at 2294, 2296.
[99] Id. at 2297 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Petitioners did not question the validity of our
precedents, which consistently have recognized that an opt-out system of fee collection comports
with the Constitution.”).
[100] Id. at 2290 (“[A]cceptance of the opt-out approach appears to have come about more as a
historical accident than through the careful application of First Amendment principles.”).
[101] See id. at 2288-91.
[102] See Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights
After Knox v. SEIU Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. No. 5 (forthcoming 2013), available at,
http://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2185415. For pre-Knox criticism of
the difference in treatment between unions and corporations with respect to use of dissenters’
funds for political purposes, see Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out
Rights after Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. (2012).
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[103] For a discussion of the roles of public sector collective bargaining see David Lewin, et
al., Getting it Right: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications from Research on PublicSector Unionism and Collective Bargaining, EMP. POL’Y RES. NETWORK, March 16,
2011, http://www.employmentpolicy.org/sites/www.employmentpolicy.org/files/EPRN%20P
S%20draft%203%2016%2011%20PM%20FINALtk-ml4%20edits.pdf.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BY, STUDENT EDITORIAL BOARD
Alec Hausermann, Daniel Quist, Ryan Thoma, and Daniel Zapata
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the
public employee collective bargaining statutes.
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Bargaining Units

In Danville Community Consolidated School District 118 and Danville Education
Association, IEA-NEA, Case No. 2013-RS-0002-S (IELRB 2013), the IELRB
certified the proposed merger of two bargaining units, one consisting of teachers
and teacher aides and another consisting of secretarial and clerical employees even
though it had previously determined that the teachers did not share a sufficient
community of interest with the clerical employees to justify the inclusion of both
groups in a single bargaining unit.
In 1987, the Danville Education Association filed a petition with the IELRB seeking
to add non-unionized teacher aides and clerical employees to an existing
bargaining unit of teachers. In its 1989 Opinion and Order, the IELRB decided that
such a bargaining unit would be inappropriate, finding that the teachers and
clerical employees did not share a sufficient community of interest to justify
including them in the same bargaining unit. The IELRB noted that the Association
only sought to add a portion of the District’s unrepresented employees to the unit
and suggested that if the Association had sought to create a “wall-to-wall”
bargaining unit of all of the District’s unrepresented employees, such a bargaining
unit might be appropriate because it would increase bargaining efficiency.
Pursuant to its 1989 Opinion and Order, the IELRB certified the Association as the
exclusive representative of two distinct bargaining units, one consisting of teachers
and teacher aides and another of secretarial and clerical employees. In the interim,
the remaining portions of the District’s workforce were organized. On August 1,
2012 the Association filed a new representation petition seeking to merge the
teacher/teacher aide bargaining unit and the clerical bargaining unit into one.
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The IELRB framed the issue as “whether the situation has changed since our
previous decision in 1989 so that the unit proposed in this case is now appropriate.”
Both parties stipulated that the duties of the teachers, teacher aides, and clerical
employees had not materially changed since the 1989 decision.
In determining that the merger was appropriate, the IELRB first discussed the fact
that the District’s remaining employees were now unionized. In its 1989 decision,
the IELRB declared that “[k]ey to our determination is the fact that the requested
unit seeks some, but not all, of the District’s remaining employees.” In that case,
the IELRB declared that in a “residual or wall-to-wall unit” the preference for a
community of interest within the bargaining unit can be overridden “in order to
achieve efficiency and to ensure an opportunity for representation for everyone.”
In this case, the IELRB held that the lack of a community of interest between the
teachers and clerical staff was less dispositive now that the entirety of the District’s
staff was unionized, stating, “The unit that is proposed in this case is similar to a
residual unit in terms of efficiency in bargaining, because it reduces the number of
units with which the District must bargain. Therefore, a lesser community of
interest can be acceptable. “
The Board next analyzed the parties’ bargaining history, observing that a history
of coordinated bargaining is a factor leaning in favor of merging two units. The
record showed that since 1989, the Association and the District had negotiated
successor collective bargaining agreements for the teacher/teacher aide bargaining
unit and the clerical bargaining unit “on the same days and at the same time.” THE
IELRB Found that there existed a history of coordinated bargaining.
The IELRB relied on Black Hawk College Professional Technical Unit v. IELRB,
where the Illinois Appellate Court held that when evaluating the proposed merger
of two bargaining units, the Board is to focus on the similarities of the two units
instead of the differences. 275 Ill.App.3d 189, 655 N.E.2d 1054 (1st Dist. 1995).
Further, the Board cited the Appellate Court for the proposition that that IELRA
does not require that a bargaining unit be the most appropriate unit possible under
the statute, but only “that the unit be appropriate.” See Sandburg Faculty Ass’n,
IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 248 Ill.App.3d 1028, 1036, 618 N.E.2d 989, 995 (1993).
Finally, the IELRB recognized that its decision finding the proposed unit
appropriate did not end the matter. The Board stated that: “[w]hether the
proposed bargaining unit is ultimately approved will depend on the desires of the
employees, [who] [] will have the opportunity to express [their opinions] in the
election to be conducted subsequently.” The IELRB directed that a unit-preference
vote be conducted among the employees.
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Anti-Union Discrimination

In Illinois Eastern Community Colleges Association v. Board of Trustees of
Illinois Eastern Community Colleges, Case No. 2011-CA-0008-S (IELRB 2013),
the IELRB affirmed the Recommended Decision of the ALJ that the complaint be
dismissed because the Complainants failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination to discourage union activity.
The events giving rise to this complaint began in early 2010 when the Employer
compiled a list of twenty-seven employees for a reduction-in-force (“RIF”). The list
included five employees who Complainants alleged were targeted for their union
activity. Prior to the final determination by the Employer one of the five employees
resigned from employment. In March, the Employer determined it would be
necessary to lay-off twenty-one employees. All four of the remaining employees
who Complainant alleged were targeted for union activity, were laid off. When the
Employer recalled ten employees, none of the four were recalled.
The IELRB Board analyzed the three elements of a prima facie case of
discrimination. The first element, that the employees participated in activity
protected by the Act, was satisfied, and the Employer did not contest that
assertion. The IELRB found that that the second element of the prima facie case,
that the employer was aware of the protected activity, was also satisfied despite the
Employer’s exception with respect to two of the employees. The Board found that
both employees were heavily involved with noticeable union activities. One was a
member of the union negotiating team, and the other one was a treasurer for the
union.
The Board found that the third element of the prima facie case, that the employer
took action to encourage or discourage the protected activity, was not satisfied.
There was adverse action taken against the Complainants when they were laid-off,
but the IELRB stated that the Complainants must also show that the adverse action
was taken because of protected activity. The Complainants pointed to many
instances of what they perceived as disparate treatment against employees heavily
involved in the union, such as: not allowing one employee to teach summer school,
requesting the same employee not be a union negotiator, and forcing another
employee to teach at multiple campuses rather than just one. The IELRB
determined that all instances provided, other than one, were too remote in time to
show anti-union animus. In addition, the Board found that there was little
evidence to show that union supporters were singularly punished for actions
tolerated with respect to other employees. The Complainants also pointed to a
prior history of grievances as proof of anti-union animus, but the IELRB stated
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that a history of prior grievances or unfair labor practices is not enough on its own
to show unlawful motive. The IELRB also rejected the Complainant’s contention
that all four riffed union activists were not recalled as not establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination because there was no showing of how active the others in
the non-recalled group were or how active all the members of the union as a whole
were when compared to the group the was not recalled.
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Duty to Bargain

In Midlothian Professional Fire Fighters Association, Local 3148, International
Association of Fire Fighters and Village of Midlothian, 29 PERI ¶ 125 (IL LRB-SP
2013) (Case No. S-CA-10-287), the ILRB State Panel held that the Village of
Midlothian (“Midlothian”) violated IPLRA Section 10(a)(4) and (1) by bargaining
to impasse on its proposal that employee discipline or discharge not be subject to
the parties’ grievance and arbitration procedures.
The parties had a collective bargaining agreement that provided Midlothian with
authority to discipline or suspend employees for just cause. The agreement also
recognized the statutory authority of Midlothian’s board of fire and police
commissioners to discipline employees, and it indicated it did not intend to
diminish the authority of that entity. During negotiations for a successor
agreement, the Union made a proposal that would allow it to grieve, to arbitration,
terminations or suspensions exceeding five days. Midlothian rejected the proposal
and the successor agreement included a just cause provision. Subsequently,
Midlothian became a home rule municipality and, during additional negotiations,
Midlothian argued to the point of impasse that neither employee discipline nor
discharge should be subject to the grievance procedure. Instead, Midlothian
adopted an ordinance prohibiting the removal or discharge of employees except
for cause. The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge.
The ILRB noted that the primary issue in the case was whether the proposal made
by Midlothian, a home-rule municipality, to have discipline considered by its board
of fire and police commissioners and not pursuant to the arbitration provisions of
the parties’ collective bargaining agreement concerned a permissive subject of
bargaining. The State Panel applied its decision is Village of Wheeling, 17 PERI ¶
2018 (ILRB-SP 2001). The Board found that Village of Wheeling was sound and
that subsequent legislative activity revealed an intent to broaden its applicability
to include the instant matter.

SPRING 2013

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

27

The State Panel noted that the statutory amendment at issue in Village of
Wheeling, Public Act 91-650, was intended to “undo” an appellate court decision
that held that a city is precluded from bargaining over matters that are covered by
the Municipal Code. The Board noted that its Village of Wheeling decision is
based on the premise that any substantive term agreed to by the parties pursuant
to their Section 7 bargaining obligation creates a statutory right to grievance
arbitration pursuant to the contractual provision required by Section 8 in all
circumstances, “unless [as Section 8 permits] mutually agreed otherwise.” Thus,
while the substantive matters affecting terms and conditions of employment
bargained in Section 7 are mandatory, the Board in Village of Wheeling found that
Section 8’s reference to the “mutual agree[ment]” to avoid arbitration on
substantive matters was a permissive subject of bargaining.
Moreover, the Board noted that the language in the Municipal Code relied on by
the Village of Wheeling was amended in 2007 to the following (strike-outs show
language stricken by the 2007 amendment and the italicized portion shows
language newly added in 2007):
§10-2.1-17. Removal or discharge; investigation of charges; retirement. Except as hereinafter
provided in this Section, no officer or member of the fire or police department of any municipality
subject to this Division 2.1 shall be removed or discharged except for cause, upon written charges,
and after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. The hearing shall be as hereinafter
provided, unless the employer and the labor organization representing the person have negotiated
an alternative or supplemental form of due process based upon impartial arbitration as a term of a
collective bargaining agreement. Such In non-home rule units of government, such bargaining
shall be permissive rather than mandatory unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. Any such
alternative agreement shall be permissive. such contract term was negotiated by the employer and
the labor organization prior to or at the time of the effective date of this amendatory Act, in which
case such bargaining shall be considered mandatory .

Further, the State Panel noted that the legislative history confirmed that the
General Assembly intended to make the holding of Village of Wheeling universally
applicable. Specifically, the Board relied on a comment by Illinois Representative
Dugan that stated that the 2007 amended Code provision was intended to create
equal bargaining rights for all professional firefighters, regardless of whether their
employer was a home rule municipality, a non-home rule municipality, or a fire
protection district.
B.

Supervisors

On April 5, 2013, Governor Pat Quinn signed SB 1556 into law (Public Act 0971172), available
at, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=097-1172,
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which makes several changes to the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA).
The bill was passed in the Senate on January 8, 2013, after passing the House back
in May 2011, but the bill remained on the Governor’s desk for several months
before he signed it in early April. The amendments to the IPLRA contained in the
bill went into effect immediately.
SB 1556 makes several changes to the IPLRA, each of which make it easier to
exclude managers and supervisors from coverage under the Act and some
provisions that give the Governor power to remove individuals from bargaining
units. Under the IPLRA as now amended, state employees working under the
Attorney General, the Comptroller, the Secretary of State and the Treasurer, that
were certified in a bargaining unit on or after December 2, 2008, which a petition
was filed with the ILRB on or after the effective date of SB 1556, or for which a
petition is pending before the ILRB, now are covered by a much more narrow
definition of “managerial employee.” The new definition no longer requires that an
individual be “predominantly” engaged in managerial and executive functions to
qualify as a managerial employee. Further, the definition was also expanded by
adding language to exclude workers “who [represent] management interests by
taking or recommending discretionary actions that effectively control or
implement policy.”
The bill also makes substantive changes to the supervisory exclusion for the same
class of workers covered by the definitional change for managerial employees.
These workers are now subject to the same standards used under the National
Labor Relations Act, as the changes to the IPLRA explicitly reference the NLRA
and relevant NLRB precedent. The changed language states that these employees
will qualify as a supervisor based on “(A) Section 152 of the National Labor
Relations Act and (B) orders of the National Labor Relations Board interpreting
that provision or decisions of courts reviewing decisions of the National Labor
Relations Board.”
The amendments also limit which workers can be included in bargaining units by
amending the definition of “public employer” to exclude the Office of the Governor,
the Governor’s Office of Management and Budget, the Illinois Finance Authority,
the Office of the Lt. Governor, and the State Board of Elections.
Another important change made by SB 1556 was defining a new class of employees
labeled “legislative liaisons,” which are also excluded from the IPLRA’s coverage.
The Act defines legislative liaisons as “a person who is an employee of a State
agency, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Comptroller, or the
Treasurer, as the case may be, and whose job duties require the person to regularly
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communicate in the course of his or her employment with any official or staff of
the General Assembly of the State of Illinois for the purpose of influencing any
legislative action.”
Finally, one of the most significant changes contained in SB 1556 is the addition of
Section 6.1 to the IPLRA, which gives the Governor the power to exempt up to
3,580 positions in agencies directly responsible to him from the Act’s coverage.
Out of this total number of positions that can be exempted, the Governor is able to
exempt up to 1,900 that are already included in a bargaining unit; effectively giving
the Governor power to remove employees added to bargaining units over the last
several years. However, this provision of the Bill does include some limitations on
the types of positions that may be exempted. The Governor has one year from the
effective date of the amendatory Act to exercise the powers added by Section 6.1.

